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SUMMARY 
 
The relationship between fiscal imbalances and other macroeconomic variables is complex and 
multifaceted. However, it remains important to understand it, not least in order to facilitate the design 
of appropriate policy. One central issue is whether the relationship varies across countries or groups of 
countries. If it does, an implication is that policy will also have to be differentiated. This paper 
empirically explores the relationship between fiscal imbalances and pressures in the foreign exchange 
(FX) market in Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) and East Asia & the Pacific (EAP) regions. Using 
panel data over 1970-2000, it finds that fiscal imbalances have a significant effect on FX pressures in 
LAC but not in EAP. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two issues of central importance to developing and emerging economies relate to the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal deficits and the choice of exchange rate regime. A key element in the Washington 
Consensus was that large fiscal deficits have severe deleterious effects and need to be reduced or 
eliminated, while another element of it focused on the need to avoid currency misalignment.i In 
principle, these issues may be connected in as much as the monetary implications of fiscal deficits are 
inflationary and, in the context of pegged exchange rates, lead to a loss of competitiveness. Indeed the 
first generation currency crisis model built on this connection to show how fiscal deficits could cause 
current account balance of payments deficits, a loss of international reserves and financial crisis.ii At 
the same time currency misalignment may have implications for the fiscal balance as, for example, the 
revenues from trade taxes are affected. 
 
Theoretical analysis suggests that the impact of fiscal deficits will vary according to a range of factors 
that are likely to differ across countries. It is therefore unsafe to assume that they will have any one 
particular set of effects. Empirical studies have tended to confirm this supposition (see, for example, 
Easterly and Schmidt Hebbel, 1994). 
 
Part of the difficulty in assessing the effects of fiscal deficits is that they can materialise in various 
ways; some direct and some indirect. Moreover, the diverse effects may be offsetting. This creates a 
daunting challenge for any study that seeks to estimate their detailed macroeconomic consequences. 
This paper has a much more modest objective. It concentrates on the relationship between fiscal 
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deficits and pressures in the foreign exchange market. Do countries with larger fiscal deficits 
experience more foreign exchange market pressures? Furthermore, does the nature of the relationship 
differ across groups of countries? To test this, we commence with what has almost become a stylised 
fact; namely that fiscal deficits have constituted a more significant problem for Latin American than 
for Asian economies. This idea found succinct summary amongst those who criticised the IMF's initial 
response to the economic crisis in East Asia in 1997/98. Here, critics claimed that the Fund adopted a 
conventional and fiscally contractionary approach to dealing with foreign exchange crises that had 
little to do with fiscal excesses. Is the evidence consistent with the suggestion that Latin America and 
Asia differ when it comes to the association between fiscal deficits and foreign exchange markets?iii 
 
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 reviews descriptive statistics relating to fiscal 
imbalances in Latin America and Asia. These imply that the effects of fiscal deficits may indeed be 
expected to be different across the two regions. Section 3 explains the methodology used to estimate 
more formally the relationship between fiscal deficits and foreign exchange market pressures as well as 
to explore the relevance of the exchange rate regime as classified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Our 
methodology has a number of advantages over that adopted in much of the existing literature on 
currency crises since it allows us to map pressures in the foreign exchange market as a continuous 
variable. The least squares dummy variables method is used to estimate the panel. The section then 
goes on to present and interpret our findings. Section 4 briefly examines some of the broader policy 
implications of our results for the design of fiscal policy in the two regions. Section 5 offers a few 
concluding remarks and points to some of the limitations of the research reported in the paper. 
 
2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal deficits 
may vary across countries. If there are differences in private sector saving-investment imbalances, in 
the structure of domestic financial markets, in the degree of capital mobility and confidence amongst 
capital markets and in the nature of exchange rate regimes, there are also likely to be differences in the 
effects of fiscal deficits. Focusing on foreign exchange market pressures, it may be assumed that these 
will be more strongly related to fiscal deficits where private sector saving is low, where current 
account deficits are high, where external debt is large and where, perhaps as a consequence, the 
confidence of capital markets is low. Confidence may also be affected by the perceived strength of any 
commitment to defend the exchange rate and by the general reputation of policy makers for sound 
economic management. Those countries that have a history of failed attempts to stabilise exchange 
rates and a track record of weak economic management may find it more difficult to sustain fiscal 
deficits by means of capital inflows with the result that such imbalances lead to greater foreign 
exchange market pressure. 
 
Table 1 presents comparative data relating to the factors that theory and empiricism suggest may have 
a bearing on the relationship between fiscal deficits and foreign exchange market pressures. We 
present this at a high level of aggregation. While recognising that cross-country variations within 
regions may be important and interesting and that these differences will be concealed by looking at 
regional averages, our objective in this paper is to explore whether there is evidence of regional 
variation between Latin America and Asia. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 6
 
The table shows that over the period 1970-2000 fiscal deficits, as measured by their mean value, have 
been of similar magnitude in the two regions (they averaged 2.64 percent of GDP in Latin America and 
2.60 percent in Asia). However, when we consider the median, which is not affected by extreme 
values, the overall budget balance is in fact lower for Latin America. The good news for LAC though 
stops here, as it is apparent from the data that the budget balance has been substantially less volatile in 
the EAP region. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that private savings are generally higher in Asia than 
in Latin America and this will tend to offset the macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits.iv 
 
External indebtedness appears to be greater in Latin America (average 68.8%) than in Asia (50.5%). A 
given budget deficit implies a lower rate of debt build-up in Asia because growth rates are generally 
much higher than in Latin America in our sample period. But again, the median for Latin America is 
substantially lower than the mean -and of similar magnitude to the Asian median value- indicating that 
not all countries in the geographical area have maintained high debt-to-GDP ratios. The mean is 
affected by a few high-debt countries like Nicaragua, Bolivia and Panama. The year-on-year increases 
in external debt as a fraction of GDP over the sample period averaged about 1% in EAP and 1.5% in 
LAC. However, if we consider the median instead of the mean, the average increases were actually 
higher in Asia. 
 
Despite this fact, capital markets have in general charged Latin American countries a 50 per cent 
higher interest rate for lending to them. Both the mean and median values indicate that they have 
treated the region as a whole more unfavourably than Asia. This has led debt service costs to be higher 
in LAC (5.4% of GNI) than in EAP (4.2%). The respective interest costs are 2.9 percent and 1.8 
 7
percent of GNI showing that the difference in interest costs between the two regions is more than 1 
percentage point of gross national income. This implies that markets have had less confidence in Latin 
America, perhaps reflecting doubts about economic management. 
 
Turning to the monetary sector, EAP had faster growing M2 as a percentage of GDP between 1970 and 
2000. Despite this, inflation and its volatility have been substantially higher in LAC, again perhaps 
indicating that there have been problems of monetary policy credibility. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Nicaragua, and Peru especially have all experienced hyper-inflation. 
 
Do these differences in fiscal and monetary policies between Asia and Latin America translate into 
differential foreign exchange market behaviour? At the high level of aggregation we adopt, the answer 
is positive. Domestic currencies in Latin America depreciated faster than in Asia (20% compared to 
7.1%) and nominal exchange rates have been twice as volatile. Shifts across different exchange rate 
regimes (the latter are classified in Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) are also more frequent in Latin 
America. In addition, using a market pressure index, which we define in the next section, we find that 
pressures are less intense and the FX market is less volatile in Asia. 
 
The descriptive data show that in our sample period the size of Latin American deficits (as a proportion 
of GDP) have not been excessive. However, they have been more volatile than EAP deficits and 
overall indebtedness has also been higher in the LAC region. Furthermore, Latin American countries 
have experienced more rapid inflation and more volatile foreign exchange markets than Asian 
countries. Given the overall economic picture, the data provide some, but certainly not conclusive, 
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prima facia evidence to suggest that fiscal deficits may have been more significant in causing pressures 
in the foreign exchange market in Latin America than in Asia.  
It may be that with a poor economic record, even currently good performance is viewed as temporary; 
it may, therefore, have little effect on confidence in international capital markets. Either good or poor 
economic performance needs to be sustained in order to change market perceptions of ‘permanent’ 
policy. 
 
In the context of Latin America, for example, reduced fiscal deficits in the early 1990s, may have 
failed to create strong market  confidence if the perception was that there would be backsliding 
towards higher deficits in the future.  At the same time, with a reputation for sound economic policy 
and budgetary prudence, increasing fiscal deficits in Asia would not necessarily lead to a loss of 
market confidence since the expectation would be that fiscal laxity would be corrected.v 
 
In the following section we move on to present a more formal empirical test of the relationship 
between fiscal deficits and foreign exchange market pressures across Latin America and Asia. 
However, the foregoing descriptive discussion leads us to anticipate a stronger connection between 
them in Latin America than in Asia. 
 
3. FORMAL TESTS AND FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we discuss our data, methodology and results concerning the association between 
budget imbalances and foreign exchange market pressures in both Latin America & Caribbean and 
East Asia & the Pacific. The data come from the International Financial Statistics and the Global 
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Development Finance databases of the IMF and the World Bank. The frequency is annual and the 
sample period is 1970-2000.  
Our aim is to explain changes in FX pressures resulting from changes in fundamentals. More 
specifically, we test whether the same set of macroeconomic variables –especially fiscal imbalances– 
contribute significantly to FX pressures in both the EAP and LAC regions. The list of control variables 
is designed to capture the effects of domestic fiscal and monetary policies (e.g. the budget balance, the 
debt ratio, the share of short-term debt for the former and the ratio of M2 to GDP and domestic credit 
to the private sector for the latter), other domestic macro variables and indicators which the 
government affects only to a limited extent or only in the long run (e.g. real GDP, the current account, 
foreign direct investment), foreign policy variables (e.g. the US interest rate) and finally the exchange 
rate regime (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). Table 2 reports the pool of variables used in the 
analysis.vi 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Our estimation procedure uses a weighted index of changes in the nominal exchange rate, the short-
term interest rate and the level of international reserves to capture pressure in the foreign exchange 
market. Solely focusing on the movements of the exchange rate would not be appropriate, as 
speculative pressure may have been fended off by central bank intervention (through the sale of 
international reserves and/or increases of the domestic interest rate to absorb excess supply and support 
the domestic currency). Hence, a weighted scheme also involving reserves and interest rates is needed 
to identify instances of speculative attacks. 
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The index we construct has its roots in Girton and Roper (1977) who devised a measure of the volume 
of FX intervention needed to achieve a given exchange rate target in the context of a money demand 
model of the balance of payments. The empirical estimation of their monetary model employed for the 
first time a pressure index consisting of nominal exchange rate and international reserves movements. 
Since then, similar indexes (usually augmented with interest rates), loosely based on Girton and Roper 
(1977) but not bound by the restrictions of a tight structural framework, have been used in the currency 
crises literature to capture speculative attacks (e.g. see Eichengreen et al., 1996). Admittedly, the 
approach is rather ad-hoc but it provides a realistic picture of FX conditions and is empirically 
relevant.vii Our measure of foreign exchange market pressure, which is calculated for each country in 
the sample separately, is given by: 
 
     RESdIRDdXRdFXMP logloglog JED  , 
 
where XR stands for the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar, IRD for the domestic short-term 
interest rate and RES for international reserves in dollars.viii Depreciations of the domestic currency, 
hikes of short-term interest rates and losses of reserves lead to an increase in the value of the index, 
indicating heightened FX pressure. The weightsD ,E  and J  are determined by the corresponding 
ratios of one over the standard deviation of each variable divided by the sum of all three ratios, e.g. for 
the weight of the nominal exchange rateD  we calculate:   
 
RESdIRDdXRd
XRd
SDSDSD
SD
logloglog
log
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
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where SD is the standard deviation. This weighting scheme ensures that more volatile series are 
assigned a lower weight and do not dominate the index. The last row of Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for FXMP across the LAC and EAP regions. 
 
Our methodology is the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimation method for panel data. We 
allow the intercept to vary across countries and consider fixed rather than random effects. The chosen 
formulation of the model follows both from statistical tests and intuition. Heterogeneity tests indicate 
that pooling the data would not be appropriate and hence we have to consider some kind of intercept or 
slope variation. Since we want to introduce cross-country heterogeneity into a highly aggregated 
dataset, we opt for cross-sectional variation of the intercept (varying slopes complicate the analysis 
without adding to the intuition). We also choose fixed effects since our dataset is not a random draw 
from the population of countries but is chosen specifically because of the countries' geographical 
location. Hausman tests confirm the validity of this choice. 
 
Figure 1 plots data combinations of FXMP and the budget balance. The regression line for the EAP 
countries (top panel) shows that the association between the two variables is positive but of negligible 
magnitude. In contrast, the regression line for the LAC countries is clearer, picking up a negative 
relationship: as the budget balance moves in the direction of a surplus pressures in the FX market 
subside. A simple panel least squares regression with fixed effects of FXMP on the budget balance 
gives a negative coefficient for both regions. The coefficient for Asia, however, is insignificant at any 
meaningful level [-0.24 (0.42)], whereas the coefficient for Latin America is highly significant [-1.34 
(0.36)]. 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Given the high level of aggregation, it is next shown that the models that best fit the data differ across 
Asia and Latin America. Our approach is to select the combination of fundamentals that best explains 
FXMP in each region. We ensure that the final model only contains right hand-side variables that have 
significant explanatory power and is not over-sensitive to the addition or deletion of other variables. 
This elaborate process delivers specifications that work reasonably well. It is striking that the best 
specifications for Asia and Latin America share only one common variable. Unfortunately for 
policymakers in both regions, this variable is the US fed funds rate. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 3 reports results from both best models. It also reports the outcome of the following exercise: we 
estimate the specification that works best for LAC countries using EAP data and the specification that 
works best for EAP countries using LAC data. Columns (2) and (4) in the table confirm that it would 
be unwise to assume that the same set of causal relationships explain FX pressures in both regions. 
This implies that empirical studies of currency crises using large sample datasets may be adopting a 
possibly unacceptable level of aggregation. Admittedly, the same criticism, but to a lesser extent, could 
apply to our results: the circumstances that generate movements in the FX market may be unique to a 
country or sets of countries with similar characteristics. It is our implicit assumption that Latin 
American and Asian economies have a sufficient degree of homogeneity within region (but not across 
region as we have seen). 
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The other important point that can be verified from Table 3 is that budget imbalances are indeed 
significant for Latin America but not for Asian countries. That is not to say that loose fiscal policies 
should be adopted by Asian countries, but rather that the explanation of FX disturbances in Asia lies 
elsewhere. By the same token, Latin American countries with a history of defaults and debt 
accumulation problems should try to achieve the fiscal discipline, levels of growth and social 
consensus that is necessary to build a secure fiscal outlook. The finding of a negative correlation 
between the budget balance and FX market pressures in the LAC region is further enhanced by 
estimating the best equation for the region using data between 1990 and 2000 (the estimation sample is 
reduced to 156 observations). As the 1990s were a period in which LAC countries managed to improve 
their fiscal outlook, one would expect that the gradual shift to smaller deficits would reduce pressures. 
The estimation results (not reported) confirm this as the estimated coefficient for budget is 
significantly negative. Figure 2 shows how LAC FX market pressures subsided in the 90s when the 
balance budget was improving. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The table presents evidence that, apart from budget imbalances and the US interest rate, the exchange 
rate regime may be affecting FXMP in LAC. The picture in EAP countries is different: domestic credit 
to the private sector, the maturity structure of external debt and the US interest rate appear to be the 
contributing macro variables. It is interesting that the exchange rate regime is mainly relevant to the 
LAC region where adopting some sort of peg reduces FX pressures significantly. Further regressions 
(not reported) show that choosing an intermediate exchange rate arrangement delivers the same 
positive result, even though the magnitude is smaller. The choice of exchange rate regime is found to 
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be insignificant in the best model for the EAP region. Occasionally, variable fixed enters alternative 
specifications significantly and correctly signed (e.g. as in the last column of Table 3) but, in general, it 
is not robust to different specifications (e.g. if we add it to the best EAP model, it does not have any 
explanatory power). 
It is not our claim that the models presented here resolve the issues relating to the effects of 
fundamentals on foreign exchange market movements in the two regions. The relatively low 
explanatory power of the preferred specifications suggests that there are more unanswered questions to 
be addressed. Our results do, however, suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate, given 
the different underlying causal factors. We discuss this issue in the next section. 
 
4. DIRECT AND INDIRECT POLICY IMPLICATIONS: A DISCUSSION 
 
The policy implications that follow on from the empirical analysis in this paper are at one and the same 
time both straightforward and complex. The straightforward implications are that in endeavouring to 
moderate foreign exchange market instability in Latin America it is important to establish the secure 
management of fiscal policy. In this respect those who have emphasised the central importance of 
reducing fiscal deficits and establishing fiscal sustainability in the region have been right to do so. 
However, another policy implication is that it is misplaced to assume that fiscal correction is always 
and everywhere central to establishing a stable foreign exchange market. In Asia, fiscal deficits have 
not been significantly related to FX instability. This is not, of course, to argue that fiscal policy can be 
safely ignored in such cases. Just because fiscal deficits have not been a source of a problem in the past 
does not mean that they could not become a source of a problem in the future. But it does mean that in 
looking for an explanation of foreign exchange pressures in Asia, it is incorrect to emphasise fiscal 
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deficits. This, in turn, means that fiscal contraction should not have formed the basis of crisis 
correction and avoidance. 
 
The complex part of the policy implications is in designing remedies to the problems that have been 
identified. Each region may need its own policy agenda. How can fiscal deficits be reduced in Latin 
America? There is no short answer. Fiscal deficits are the outcome of complex political economy 
factors. An attempt to impose ‘simple’ solutions, such as establishing fiscal rules of one form or 
another, may not succeed.  Without addressing the root causes of fiscal deficits such rules would be 
breached and this would further undermine the confidence of markets and probably lead to further 
exchange market instability. In as much as there is a simple policy conclusion, it is that until a greater 
understanding of the causes of fiscal deficits in Latin America is achieved, and measures put in place 
to moderate them, foreign exchange market pressures are likely to continue to bedevil the region.ix 
This conclusion would probably be confirmed by regional disaggregation. It is surely not coincidental 
that, from amongst the Latin American economies, Chile has shown the greatest ability to avoid 
foreign exchange market instability and at the same time has exhibited superior fiscal management.x 
 
This, having been said, fiscal policy in Latin America in the mid 2000s has shown signs of 
improvement. As the IMF observed, ‘it is encouraging that, in contrast to recoveries in the 1990s, 
many governments have taken advantage of the favourable economic conditions to strengthen their 
fiscal positions…and improve their debt structures,’ (IMF, World Economic Outlook, April, 2005). A 
distinction may still have to be drawn between the oil exporting countries (Ecuador, Mexico and 
Venezuela) where the increase in oil prices resulted in revenue gains, and other countries in the region 
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(apart from Argentina) where revenue gains were more modest. Moreover, public debt remains high in 
the region as a whole. 
 
In order to reduce future pressures on their exchange rates it is important that Latin  American 
countries maintain progress towards fiscal consolidation in ways that are sustainable rather than by 
relying on windfall revenue gains from oil prices or on spending cuts and distortionary taxes that may 
reduce economic growth and may end up being reversed. Further moves to broaden the tax base and 
create space for pro-growth and social expenditure are relevant in this context. 
 
In Asia our results suggest that relieving pressures on the exchange rate hinge on the management of 
short term debt rather than on reducing fiscal deficits. The currency crisis literature has emphasised the 
significance of short term external debt relative to international reserves in explaining the incidence of 
crises. Tight fiscal policy in Asia may allow sovereign debt to be reduced. It may also have 
contributed, alongside exchange policy, to the accumulation of reserves and thereby have reduced the 
region’s vulnerability to crisis at least in the near term.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has sought to examine the nature of the empirical relationship between fiscal imbalances 
and foreign exchange market pressures. Given the various routes via which fiscal imbalances exert 
macroeconomic effects, we opt not to formulate a specific model of fiscal impact that we then set out 
to test. However, our empirical estimation is informed by relevant theory. This theory suggests that 
fiscal deficits will be more significant in explaining foreign exchange market pressures in some sets of 
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circumstances than in others. We surmise that fiscal deficits will have played a more significant role in 
accounting for foreign exchange instability in Latin America than in Asia since the economic 
circumstances conducive to such a connection are found in greater abundance in this region. Our 
formal results support this hypothesis. Fiscal deficits have exerted a significant effect on foreign 
exchange pressures in Latin America but not in Asia. This finding is reassuringly consistent with 
stylised facts about the two regions. The principal contribution of the paper is therefore in providing 
empirical support for this view. 
 
The research reported in this paper still leaves plenty of questions unanswered. Is it reasonable to treat 
Latin America and Asia as uniform entities or is there intra regional variation? The descriptive 
statistics reported here suggest that there is. We therefore need to be aware of the danger of over-
generalisation. Furthermore, to discover that fiscal deficits are significant in explaining market 
pressures in some cases but not in others raises the policy question of how to reduce them in those 
cases where they have had a significant adverse effect. There is also the question of how best to reduce 
exchange rate pressures in regions where fiscal deficits have not played a significant role. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
i In presenting what he argued were ten policy reforms widely held to be needed in Latin American 
countries Williamson, who coined the phrase ‘Washington Consensus’ in 1989, listed fiscal discipline 
first amongst them; the idea that budget deficits should be small enough to be financed without 
recourse to the inflation tax. The view in Washington, as he perceived it, was that excessive budget 
deficits in Latin America had led to inflation, and that tighter fiscal discipline was essential. Fifth on 
Williamson's list was that the exchange rate should be ‘at a level sufficiently competitive to induce 
rapid growth in non-traditional exports’. Although he has later argued that this actually misrepresented 
the view in Washington at the end of the 1980s, it is probably fair to suggest that exchange rate 
misalignment was seen as undesirable (Williamson, 2004).   Subsequently, and for a time, the 
consensus on the exchange rate was to become the bi-polar view that emerging and developing 
economies should adopt either fully flexible or immutably fixed exchange rates. For a review and 
discussion of evolving views on the choice of exchange rate regimes see, for example, Bird (2002). 
ii We do not directly cite the literature on currency crises in this paper since Eichengreen (1999) 
provides a succinct summary of the three generations of currency crisis model. 
iii Latin America and LAC as well as Asia and EAP are used interchangeably in the text. 
iv In the early 1990s the saving rate in Latin America was just under 20 per cent whereas it was almost 
35 per cent in East Asia. Much of the discussion relating to the economic problems encountered in 
Latin America has focused on the region's low savings rate (see for example, Bird and Helwege, 1994, 
and Edwards, 1996).  Poor economic performance may be a reflection of low saving irrespective of 
whether it is private or public saving. In the case of Asia, analyses of the 1997/98 crisis did not 
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attribute it to low saving either in the form of low private or public saving, but rather to unproductive 
investment and weaknesses in the domestic financial system. The inappropriate sequencing of financial 
liberalisation, the policy of de facto pegging to the US dollar and the liquidity problems associated 
with sudden capital outflows or the unwillingness of creditors to roll over maturing debt have also been 
seen as important factors.  One of us has examined these issues, in detail, elsewhere (Bird and Milne, 
1999, and Bird and Rajan, 2002). 
v While backsliding could be a consequence of governments being unwilling to continue to carry the 
political cost of reducing government expenditure and extending the tax base or increasing the tax rate, 
it may also be the case that apparent fiscal relapse could be associated with a round of privatisation 
coming to an end. In these circumstances, maintaining the revenue stream depends on more deep 
seated tax reform, even though government expenditure may have been more permanently reduced. 
Moreover, of course, if policies of economic liberalisation fail to generate sustained increases in 
economic growth, tax revenue may be adversely affected. 
vi Note that since our regressions include the budget balance and the current account we do not directly 
include the private sector saving balance. 
vii Despite the popularity of similar indices with researchers, their use is not without its critics (see, for 
example, Eika et al., 1996). 
viii Ideally, the index would feature the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) rather than the nominal 
exchange rate against the US dollar, as the inclusion of the latter rules out the dollar’s levitation as a 
cause of crisis. Data limitations on the NEER though prevent us from using it in the construction of the 
index. 
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ix There are, of course, the almost self evident points that excessive government expenditure needs to 
be avoided and its composition needs to be assessed in terms of the contribution made to economic 
growth. What are the priority areas in terms of government expenditure? At the same time, the level 
and structure of taxes need to be examined to minimise distortionary effects and negative growth 
effects. The difficulty is not in defining such basic principles but in understanding why they have not 
been applied; particularly if they are self-evident. Is it that policymakers are uneducated in basic 
economics! Or, more likely, is it that political factors make it very difficult to implement appropriate 
reforms. 
x Superior management may include the design of pension schemes. The Chilean approach involves 
shifting away from a pay-as-you-go scheme towards a funded scheme, with the transition period being 
financed by taxation as opposed to borrowing. Such a change may have a positive impact on overall 
saving. 
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APPENDIX 
 
List of countries 
 
Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
1.  Argentina 2.  Belize 3.  Bolivia 4.  Brazil 5.  Chile 6. Colombia 7.  Costa Rica 8.  Dominica 9.  
Dominican Republic 10. Ecuador 11. El Salvador 12. Grenada 13. Guatemala 14. Guyana 15. 
Haiti 16. Honduras 17. Jamaica 18. Mexico 19. Nicaragua 20. Panama 21. Paraguay 22. Peru 23. St. 
Kitts and Nevis 24. St. Lucia 25. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 26. Trinidad and Tobago 27. Uruguay 
28. Venezuela, RB. 
 
East Asian and the Pacific countries 
1.  Cambodia 2.  China 3.  Fiji 4.  Indonesia 5.  Korea 6.  Lao PDR 7.  Malaysia 8.  Mongolia 9.  
Myanmar 10. Papua New Guinea 11. Philippines 12. Samoa 13. Solomon Islands 14. Thailand 15. 
Tonga 16. Vanuatu 17. Vietnam. 
 
Note: These countries correspond to the classification of the 2002 Global Development Finance CD-
ROM for LAC and EAP countries. Not all countries were included in the estimations due to lack of 
data for certain variables. 
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Figure 1: FXMP and the budget balance in EAP (top plot) and LAC (bottom plot) countries 
 
 25
 
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Mean FXMP
Mean Budget Balance (%GDP)
 
 
Figure 2: Lower FX pressure in the 90s (LAC countries) 
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Table 1: Fiscal and Monetary Indicators, 1970-2000 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. St. Dev. Obs. 
 EAP LAC EAP LAC EAP LAC EAP LAC EAP LAC EAP LAC
budget (2.6) (2.6) (2.1) (1.6) (17.9) (61.1) 4.7 5.4 3.2 5.8 273 438 
debt/GNI 50.5 68.8 40.5 42.2 1.0 2.9 327.0 1209 42.0 115.3 377 828 
dserv/GNI 4.2 5.4 3.1 4.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 51.5 3.7 4.9 377 828 
interest 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 7.9 43.7 1.6 3.2 377 828 
dm2gdp 1.4 0.7 1.2 0.6 (13.5) (41.5) 30.0 18.4 3.9 3.8 371 792 
inflation 11.1 111.2 7.2 11.6 (6.0) (11.4) 268.2 11749 17.8 736.5 399 792 
fxmp -0.3 3.2 -0.7 0.9 -51.8 -99.9 64.4 227.1 12.1 22.6 332 502 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are negative. EAP stands for East Asia & the Pacific and LAC stands 
for Latin America & the Caribbean. Budget is the budget balance to gross domestic product (GDP), 
debt/GNI is external debt to gross national income (GNI), dserv/GNI is debt service costs to GNI, 
interest is interest costs to GNI, dm2gdp is the change in the M2 to GDP ratio over the previous year, 
inflation is the percent change in the consumer price index over the previous year and fxmp is a foreign 
exchange market pressure index described in Section 3 in the text. All data have been checked for 0 
value observations and all countries report at least 5 consecutive observations of each variable. The list 
of EAP and LAC countries can be found in the Appendix. 
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Table 2: List of Variables 
 
Fiscal  
avgmat Average external debt maturity in years
budget Budget balance (% GDP)
concess Concessional debt (% Total debt)
debtflgni Total net flows of debt (% GNI)
debtpriv Private non-guaranteed debt (% Total debt)
debtratio Total debt (% GNI)
debtstflgni Net flows of short-term debt (% GNI)
stdebtratio Short-term debt (% Total debt)
stint Short-term interest payments, in dollars
ocom Commitments official creditors, in dollars
pcom Commitments private creditors, in dollars
ltdebt Total long term debt outstanding, in dollars
Monetary 
bnkres Bank liquid reserves to bank assets
dcreb Domestic credit from banks (% GDP)
dcrep Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP)
domfin Domestic financing (% GDP)
m2gdp M2 (% GDP)
Other Macro 
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cagni Current account balance (% GNI)
exports Exports of goods and services, in constant 1995$
fdigni Net foreign direct investment (% GNI)
fincons Final consumption, in constant 1995 dollars
gdp GDP, at constant 1995 dollars
gdpcap GDP per capita, at constant 1995 dollars
unempl Unemployment rate
External 
usirate Federal funds rate
Exchange rate regime 
fixed Dummy variable capturing fixed exchange rate regimes
intermed Dummy variable capturing intermediate exchange rate regimes
Notes: The dummy variable fixed has been constructed using data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
The value 1 has been assigned to the cases of no separate legal tender, pre announced peg or currency 
board arrangement, pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2\% and de 
facto peg. All other exchange rate arrangements are allocated a value 0. Variable intermed has the 
same source and is constructed with value 1 for de facto or pre announced crawling peg, de facto or pre 
announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 5\%, moving band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-2\%, and managed floating. All other exchange rate arrangements are allocated a value 0. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Best Model EAP Best Model EAP Best Model LAC Best Model LAC 
 EAP data LAC data LAC data EAP data 
constant -11.86(3.54)* -14.96(4.04)* -8.14(5.03) -6.2(3.5)*** 
budget   -0.72(0.39)*** -0.03(0.31) 
fixed   -16.11(6.42)** -4.6(2.47)*** 
usirate 0.87(0.37)** 1.9(0.37)* 2.54(0.7)* 0.8(0.45)*** 
stdebtratio 0.13(0.07)** -0.18(0.13)   
dcreb 0.06(0.04)*** 0.14(0.04)*   
R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.16 
F statistic 3.65* 2.8* 3.89* 3.15* 
Observations 316 500 281 174 
     
Notes: Estimation method is least squares dummy variables with fixed effects and correction for cross 
sectional heteroscedasticity. (*) denotes significance at the 1% level, (**) denotes significance at the 
5% level and (***) denotes significance at the 10% level. Corrected standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
